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Leadership and the Comparative Origin of Pro-developmental Ruling Coalitions in Ethiopia and Rwanda

Alagaw Ababu Kifle[a]

ABSTRACT

What does it take to forge a pro-developmental ruling coalition in Africa? This paper answers this question based on a comparative study of the origin of pro-developmental ruling coalitions in Rwanda under Kagame and Ethiopia under Meles. The paper approaches the emergence of pro-developmental ruling coalitions as a collective action problem. It argues that overcoming the two collective action problems of limiting powerful actors` resort to violence in the pursuit of their self-interest; and subordinating their short-term rent-seeking interests to long-term developmental ends, are the *sin quo non* of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition. Therefore, to study the origin of pro-developmental coalitions is to study society`s quest to overcome these two collective action problems. The paper maintains that in the quest to overcome these two collective action problems, the agency of leaders is critical because leaders possess a range of ideational, discursive/communicative, and organizational tools that may not be available to other actors. The paper demonstrates this by comparing the role of Meles of Ethiopia and Kagame of Rwanda in the emergence of pro-developmental ruling coalitions in the two countries. The findings of the paper contribute to the literature on coalition formation in Africa and leadership in developing societies.

Keywords: Collective action; ruling coalition; leadership; Ethiopia; Rwanda

1. INTRODUCTION

The political settlement of a country affects its prospect for economic development through its effect on the ruling coalition`s will and capacity to overcome the problem of violence, ensure credible commitment and address distributional conflicts.[1] A core element of the political settlement of a nation is its ruling coalition. Developmentally relevant features of a ruling coalition include the power balance between higher and lower-

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[a] Alagaw Ababu Kifle is a research fellow and Head of Fellowships at the African Leadership Centre, Nairobi Kenya.

[1]Mushtaq, H Khan (2010), *Political Settlements and the Governance of Growth-Enhancing Institutions*; Pritish Behuria, Lars Buur, and Hazel Gray (2017), 'Studying Political Settlements in Africa,' *African affairs (London)* 116 (464), 508-525; Ferguson D. William (2020), *The Political Economy of Collective Action, Inequality, and Development* (Stanford: Stanford University).

level structures of the coalition, the ruling coalition`s relations with the excluded one, the ruling coalition`s dominance over the control of the means of violence, the breadth and narrowness of a coalition`s social bases, and the coalition`s unipolarity and multipolarity.[2]

While studies on how these aspects of the ruling coalition potentially influence economic growth is growing, this is not matched by an equal interest in the origin of a pro-developmental ruling coalitions. Due to the emphasise on static dimensions of a political settlement, the adoption of pro-developmental orientation by a ruling coalition without fundamental change in the settlement is little appreciated.[3] Even when some scholars scrutinize the issue of origin, they agree neither on the object of inquiry nor on key factors affecting the emergence of pro-developmental coalitions. According to Doner, Ritchie and Slater, the study of 'origin' needs to focus on the ensemble of institutions and state-business relations that make industrial upgrading and productivity increase possible, an approach that pegged developmentalism to industrial upgrading and productivity increase.[4] Vu, on the other hand, restricts the study of 'origin' to developmental state structures regardless of their utilization for developmental ends.[5]

A difference on the object of study appears to lead to different analysis of the factors that led to the emergence of developmental states. Drawing from the case of North-East Asian states, Doner, Ritchie and Slater attributed the origin of developmental states to the systemic vulnerability ruling elites face due to the threat of popular revolution, geopolitical insecurity, and resource constraint. Vu, on the other hand, attributed the origin of the Asian developmental state to intra-elite and elite-society relations during periods of state formation. Studies outside Asia also opine that existentially threatened elites might have incentive to provide developmentalist public goods as a means for political survival.[6] However, there is also a strand of literature that emphasise the importance of the security of the ruling elites (not its vulnerability) for the pursuit of long-time horizon developmentalist orientation. This literature argues that when political leaders are too vulnerable, they resort to developmentally counter-productive ways of managing threats.[7] Thus, both the object of study in the study of 'origin' of developmental coalitions and the factors influencing the emergence of such coalitions are contested. Though these approaches agree that ruling elites prioritize political survival they disagree on what these elites will do when their survival is threatened.

This paper is a comparative study of the emergence of pro-developmental ruling coalitions in Ethiopia and Rwanda in the early 2000s. The paper asks: what does it take to forge a pro-developmental ruling coalition in Africa? The paper answers this question by synthesising the conceptual/theoretical work on collective action and leadership and relying on a review of party-state documents of Ethiopia and Rwanda, academic works, media reporting, and informal conversations with

[2] Tim Kelsall (2018), 'Towards a Universal Political Settlement Concept: A Response to Mushtaq Khan,' *African affairs (London)* 117(469) 656-669; Khan (2010); William (2020); Brian Levy(2014), *Working with the Grain : Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies* (New York: Oxford University Press).

[3] Sen Kunal, Bukenya Badru, and Hickey Samuel (2014), 'Exploring the Politics of Inclusive Development: Towards a New Conceptual Approach,' in *The Politics of Inclusive Development: Interrogating the Evidence*, ed. Hickey Samuel, Sen Kunal, and Bukenya Badru (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[4] Richard F. Doner, Bryan K. Ritchie, and Dan Slater (2005), 'Systemic Vulnerability and the Origins of Developmental States: Northeast and Southeast Asia in

Comparative Perspective,' *International Organization* 59 (02) 327-361.

[5] Tuong Vu (2007), 'State Formation and the Origins of Developmental States in South Korea and Indonesia,' *Studies in comparative international development* 41 (4) 27-56.

[6] William (2020); David Booth and Diana Cammack (2013), *Governance for Development in Africa : Solving Collective Action Problems* (London: Zed Books).

[7] Lindsay Whitfield et al.(2015), *The Politics of African Industrial Policy : A Comparative Perspective* (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press); Claude Ake and Lawrence Freedman (1996), *Democracy and Development in Africa* (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institution); David Waldner (1999), *State Building and Late Development* (London;: Ithaca, New York).

former officials of the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF).

This paper seeks to contribute to the debates on the origin of pro-developmental ruling coalitions by highlighting two relevant issues. First, the paper approaches the study of the 'origin' of pro-developmental coalitions by focusing on the problems of collective action. Collective action problems refer to social dilemmas in which the pursuit of individual interest conflict with the welfare of other individuals or groups.[8] It also denotes social situations in which collectivities fail to realize a socially optimum outcome due to anticipation of free-riding, incomplete information, or problems of coordination.[9] Collective action problems can be of first order and second order nature. The former denotes the commonly accepted free-riding problems of 'letting others do the job, take the risk, and pay the price' all the while enjoying whatever public good is produced by this effort.[10] While this type of free-riding problem, in principle, can be solved by parties agreeing to act in a particular way, designing mechanisms and arrangements that rendered these agreements credible requires solving the collective action problem at secondary level. Hence, second-order collective action problems of establishing mechanisms of coordination and enforcement ensue.[11] Second, the paper highlights the role of leaders (influential actors in the coalition in general and political leaders in particular) in the emergence of pro-developmental coalitions. While a few extant works do indeed point at the relevance of the beliefs and ideas of leaders,[12] this paper argues that the crucial role of leaders in recognizing and overcoming the aforementioned collective action problems need to be emphasised. Indeed, the 'systemic vulnerability' thesis is based on the assumption that leaders would accurately read the threat they face and would consider fast-realizing

development as the only way out of their predicament. Likewise, the elite security argument also presumes that leaders have the ambitious and vision to realize development only if they feel secure. This paper seeks to foreground this implicit assumption on the role of leaders.

The paper is structured into five sections. The next section expounds on the two collective action problems of forging a pro-developmental coalition and highlights the roles of leaders in the process. The third and fourth section analyses the origin (and demise) of pro-developmental coalition in Ethiopia and Rwanda respectively. The final section makes some concluding observations. The paper argues that the emergence of pro-developmental coalitions in Africa entails the resolution of two collective action problems of: control over powerful actors' resort to violence in the pursuit of their interest; and the subordination of their short-term rent seeking interest to long term developmental ends. The paper also argues that leaders are instrumental in the resolution of these two collective action problems to a greater extent than previous literature acknowledges.

2. FORGING A PRO-DEVELOPMENTAL COALITION AS A COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM AND LEADERS AS THE SOLUTION

Synthesizing the literature on the political settlement and collective action, I argue that a pro-developmental coalition by definition needs to overcome two collective action problems. First, it has to overcome the collective action problem among powerful actors on how to pursue their interests without the use of violence. Absent any constraining factor, powerful actors would use their power of violence for the pursuit of self-serving ends which would preclude the emergence of a sufficiently stable ruling coalition.[13] According to North, Wallis and Weingast, overcoming violence in such

[8] Luke Glowacki and Chris von Rueden (2015), 'Leadership Solves Collective Action Problems in Small-Scale Societies,' *Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences* 370(1683) 2-13.
[9] William(2020).
[10] Ibid.
[11] Ibid.
[12] D. E. F. Henley(2013), 'Sources of Developmental Ambition in Southeast Asia: Political Interests and

Collective Assumptions. Developmental Regimes in Africa\', Working Paper 02. Available at view (universiteitleiden.nl)
[13] Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast (2009), *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History* (New York: Cambridge University Press.

circumstances entails granting privileged access to economic rent for powerful actors which would limit their incentive to use violence. In line with the literature that underscores the importance of selective incentives to overcome collective action problems, they argue that the glue among powerful actors in typical developing countries is this privileged access to economic rents. Underscoring the insufficiency of incentive alone, others underscore the importance of ideas, ideology, and knowledge to overcome the problem of violence.[14] This difference notwithstanding, the formation of a ruling coalition with some mechanism for restraining powerful actors` recourse to violence in the pursuit of their interest is the first and yet insufficient step for the emergence of pro-developmental ruling coalition. If the problem of violence is not overcome, then the most basic requirement of development will remain unfulfilled.[15] Overcoming this problem of violence is a collective action problem.[16] All powerful actors benefit, to varying degrees, if they pursue their interest without recourse to violence and yet creating a mechanism that overcome this dilemma would require agreement (among these actors) with a credible mechanism of enforcement. In most developing countries this is usually overcome through the selective distribution of privilege which would make agreement self-reinforcing.[17] However, the use of selective distribution of rents generates the second dilemma that has to be overcome to forge a pro-developmental ruling coalition.

That is, the coalition has to overcome the collective action problems of letting these powerful actors subordinate their short-term interests to the long-term collective interests of economic development. Economic development requires long-term thinking and reducing unproductive rent-seeking practices and distributional demands from within the coalition.[18] Building a ruling coalition in situations of elite and societal fragmentation, as is the case in Africa, on the other hand renders

providing private benefits for powerful group politically enticing. Hence, what mechanisms elites set to prevent the adverse effects of pursuing short term interests on the pursuit of long-term developmental goals would be another challenge in the quest to forge a developmental ruling coalition. A coalition that is maintained intact by privileged access to rents would find it difficult to eschew un-developmental rent seeking practices and would struggle to make a credible commitment for investors that it will not expropriate the fruit of their investment. It can be argued, with some historical support, that a combination of centralization of rents under a leader with developmental ambition and hegemonization of developmental ideology among the ruling elite would overcome this collective action problem.[19]

A ruling coalition that is able to address these two collective action problems would have the incentive and capacity to overcome development related first order and second-order collective action problems. Hence, without reducing development to these two factors, we can argue that to ask how pro-developmental ruling coalitions emerge, in the first instance, is to ask how actors with the capacity for violence (are forced to) restrain themselves from using violence in the pursuit of their agenda and how they tended to restrain themselves from the pursuit of unproductive rent seeking practices and economic predations. It is also to inquire how the means used to address the collective action problem of limiting organized violence is reconciled with the means required to overcome the collective action problem of developing a developmentalist orientation. Indeed, a number of works argue along this line. Whitfield et al. argue that understanding why states pursue industrial policies and develop the capacity to implement them requires understanding how ruling coalitions are formed and

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[14] Kunal, Badru, and Samuel (2014).

[15] Tim Kelsall (2022), *Political Settlements and Development : Theory, Evidence, Implications*, Oxford Scholarship Online (Oxford: Oxford University Press).

[16] William (2020).

[17] North, John, Walis, and Barry(2009).

[18] Tim Kelsall and David Booth(2010), 'Developmental Patrimonialism? Questioning the Orthodoxy on

Political Governance and Economic Progress in Africa. Africa Power and Politics Programme.' Available att https://www.researchgate.net/publication/343968393 _Developmental_patrimonialism_Questioning_the_ort hodoxy_on_political_governance_and_economic_progr ess_in_Africa/link/5f4a629b92851c6cfdf9e2a5/downlo ad.

[19] Ibid.; Henley (2013).

how they acquired pro-developmental features.[20] Kunal, Badru and Samuel also indicated that political coalitions are prior to state capacity both chronologically and logically and therefore the forging of a coalition precedes the development of pro-developmental institutions and polices.[21]

Considered through this framing, both the 'systemic vulnerability' and 'security of elites' thesis noted earlier might have some merit and yet also miss another crucial point: the role of leaders. Both security and insecurity of the ruling elite might influence the emergence of a pro-developmental ruling coalition depending on how leaders attempt to marshal (in)security of elites to a developmental end. Insecure ruling elites might need leaders that convincingly and persuasively identify developmental success as a solution to its predicament and secure ruling elites might need (an)ambitious leader(s) that inspires and uplifts coalition members to aim at more than political survival. The key variable in overcoming the two collective action problems of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition would thus be neither threat to ruling coalition nor their security but the agency of leaders. Without leaders that give meaning to the threatening situation, existential threats to a ruling coalition would not be framed as such and development would not be proposed as the only way out. And without such leaders a higher vision other than political survival and the pursuit of short-term economic interests may not be articulated and thus developmental coalition is unlikely to be forged. Leaders are crucial to the process because they have a range of ideational, discursive/communicative, behavioural, organizational, and material tools to forge a developmental ruling coalition.

2.1 Tools and Resources for Developmental Leadership

Issue definition is one central too of leaders to build a pro-developmental coalition. Leaders may define the lack of development as an existential issue and/or attribute the source of past tragedy to the lack of development and therefore propose development as the only way out. By doing so, leaders might forge a cohesive coalition, justify unpopular developmental measures, and restrain the pursuit of developmentally counter-productive rent seeking practices and corruption. Such problem definition may also generate a sense of urgency to realize development and therefore ease the re-structuring of coalition in a way that realize development.

Second, leaders may also articulate a vision and narrate leadership stories related to the coalition`s past, its present and future. Leadership scholars argue that successful articulation of a vision would inspire followers to act in a way that transcend instrumental reasons for action.[22] According to this literature, by reflecting how followers see themselves, who they are, and what they wanted to be, an appealing vision shapes followers` thought, feeling and behaviour.[23] This literature also argues that a successful vision should not simply be attractive to various followers but also be based on an accurate reading of the problems the group face and should balance realism with risk and objectives with the capability to achieve them.[24] According to Gardner, leaders` visions are better presented/approached as leadership stories embodied by leaders in relation to followers because the leadership process is a journey into the future that leaders and followers pursue together to realize certain goals.[25] To shape followers perceptions and actions, the leader`s story often has to transplant, suppress, complement, or in some measure outweigh earlier stories and contemporary counter-stories (p.14). The most important stories in the leadership process, Gardner argues, are stories of group identity related to who the group is, where the group has been and where it wants to go. Haslam, Reicher and Platow picked up on this and argue that leaders are entrepreneurs of identity who create and shape (as they also reflect) the social identity

[20] Whitfield et al (2015).

[21] Kunal, Badru, and Samuel(2014)

[22] Joseph S. Nye (2008), *The Powers to Lead* (New York: Oxford University Press); Max Landsberg(2003), *The Tools of Leadership : Vision, Inspiration and Momemtum* (London: Profile).

[23] Burt Nanus (1995), *Visionary Leadership : Creating a Compelling Sense of Direction for Your Organization*, First edition. ed., The Jossey-Bass Management Series (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, a Wiley imprint).

[24] Nye (2008).

[25] Howard Gardner (1995), *Leading Minds the Anatomy of Leadership,* (USA: BasicBooks).

of the group through rhetorical and embodied acts.[26] In doing so, leaders encapsulate their vision as the vision of their group and generate the 'social forces with the size, the organization, and the sense of direction to have an effect on society'(p.163). Successfully crafted social identity creates co-acting constituencies with a shared reality.[27]

Leaders thus might seek to build pro-developmental ruling coalitions by developing a narrative that appeals to their people and has the capacity to shape their constituencies thought, feeling and behaviour. This narrative often would have stories of particular origin, predicament and direction. Leaders define who is in and who is out of this coalition while also articulating what coalition stands for and reflecting this in their behaviour and practice. A strand of the literature on political parties also corroborates this when it argues that pre-existing social cleavages, be it class, gender, ethnicity or religion are less important in the making of political identities as are the articulatory project of parties and their leader who 'suture' a coherent block out of disparate constituencies who, despite having a shared experience, may not necessarily develop a common political identity.[28] These works identify a wide array of tools political parties use to craft a common political identity among constituencies, which, they argue, includes rhetoric, public policy, state and paramilitary violence, co-option, the provision of social service and infrastructure, constitutional rule, peace commission, and electoral mobilization.[29]

That said, both the leadership literature noted above and these works on political parties acknowledges the fact that leaders/political parties cannot build whatever political identity and political block as they so wish; there is limit to their agency. These limits include the effect of pre-existing mobilizable identities and any possible permutation that can be forged out of them, the identity of the leader(s), the need and desire of potential

audiences, and the circumstance/historical period where the articulation is made.

The introduction of systems, processes and organizational structures through which the vision articulated by leaders came to be realized in practice is the other leadership tool for the forging of pro-developmental coalition. Leader(s) introduces policies based on the vision or philosophy that bind the coalition, set structure through which this policy will be implemented as well as regularly monitor and evaluate if and whether these policies and structures are leading to the realization of the vision and story articulated earlier. In this sense leaders shape the formation of developmental coalitions by identifying and defining the principle that should govern the conduct of the coalition, the operational modalities to be adhered, how adherence is to be monitored, how the agenda of the coalition to be communicated, and how distributional issues are to be addressed. A key element of these organizational tools at the disposal of leaders is monitoring of, and decision over, the flow of information and rewards within the organization.[30] The former would help them acquire accurate information about the state of the coalition and the challenges it encounters whereas the latter would help them set incentives to, and constraints on, behaviours.

Leaders would use these organizational and mobilizational structures not just to push for the realization of their vision, but also to demobilize any resistance against such visions. This is because a pro-developmental vision might have to compete with other stories that are less developmental and oriented towards building coalitions of a different nature. Realizing a pro-developmental coalition would require demobilizing these alternatives. Hence, leaders may deploy organizational structures and process for coercive and quasi-coercive tools of instilling their vision. One such less-benign tool is coercive persuasion which includes

[26] S. Alexander Haslam, Stephen Reicher, and Michael J. Platow (2011), *The New Psychology of Leadership : Identity, Influence, and Power* (Hove : Psychology Press).
[27] Stephen D. Reicher, S. Alexander Haslam, and Michael J. Platow (2018), 'Shared Social Identity in Leadership,' *Current opinion in psychology* 23, 129-133.

[28] Cedric de Leon, Manali Desai, and Cihan Tugal (2015), 'Introduction: Political Articulation: The Structured Creativity of Parties,' in *Building Blocs : How Parties Organize Society* (USA: Stanford University Press).
[29] Ibid.
[30] Nye (2008).

measures such as making any alternative than accepting the new value worse; applying pressure to destabilize their current sense of self and value, usually by creating survival anxiety; putting followers into teams so that those who embraced the new value mentor others; rewarding the team that embraced the values; and presenting the new value in many fora and through many mediums.[31] Other coercive tools would include overt repression and violence against resistant individuals to the vision articulated by the leader(s).

In general, nuances and constraint aside, it is fair to argue that a range of tools are available for leaders to overcome the two collective action problems of building a pro-developmental ruling coalition. These tools could broadly fall into: those instrumental incentives of reward and coercion; and those non-instrumental measures geared at developing shared understanding of the strategic situation, articulation of an appealing vision, development of common narratives and common sense of purpose among members of the coalition. While neither of these two categories of tools works exclusively, ruling coalitions may vary both in the way they balance these two sets of instruments of overcoming collective action and how these measures are received by followers. How leaders' measures are received by potential and actual coalition members and the extent it offers a realistic solution to the problems of the group influences what is considered as a smart way of combining these tools and thereby the success and failure of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition. Hence, though the availability of potential tools need not imply that any leader that deploys these tools in a formulaic way will succeed to forge a pro-developmental coalition, leaders still have a noticeably wider room for manoeuvre than is acknowledged in the literature. Indeed, the analysis of the Ethiopian and Rwandan case below demonstrates this influence of leaders in forging a pro-developmental coalition.

3. THE FORMATION OF THE EPRDF COALITIONS

This section traces the EPRDF effort at forging a pro-developmental coalition by overcoming the two collective action problems noted in the previous section. The Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) seized power in 1991 after overthrowing the military regime. Given the victory-based nature of the post-1991 EPRDF order, the problem of overcoming powerful actor`s resort to violence in the pursuit of their interest was overcome largely through a combination of repression, co-option, and by means of top-down hierarchical party control. In the immediate aftermath of the overthrow of the military regime the Tigrayan People Liberation Front (TPLF) organized or co-opted ethnic based liberation fronts to form the Ethiopian People Revolutionary Democratic Front.[32] By incorporating these People Democratic Organizations under the EPRDF coalition dominated by the TPLF these organization were subjected to the TPLF`s ideology of revolutionary democracy and the principle of democratic centralism.[33] Thus, they accept the EPRDF was the vanguard of progressive forces and agreed to abide by whatever decision the top leadership made. This allowed the EPRDF to control any independent action of lower-level members of the coalition. This is complemented by recruiting relatively educated but underprivileged sections of the society such as teachers for whom the very possibility of running lower administrative units was an enticing reward.[34] This was also complemented by an aggressive move to weaken alternative coalitions and their mobilization capacity for violence.[35]

[31] Ralph D. Stacey (2012), *Tools and Techniques of Leadership and Management Meeting the Challenge of Complexity* (New York, NY: Routledge).

[32] Sara Vaughan (1994), 'The Addis Ababa Transitional Conference of July 1991: Its Origin,' Available at https://openlibrary.org/books/OL582554M/The_Addis_Ababa_transitional_conference_of_July_1991.

[33] EPRDF (1992 EC), 'የዲሞክራሲ ጉዳዮች በኢትዮጲያ፤ ለውይይት የቀረበ (Issues of Democracy in Ethiopia, a Booklet Submitted for Discussion)'.

[34] Toni Weis (2016), 'Vanguard Capitalism: Party, State, and Market in the EPRDF`s Ethiopia' (PhD dissertation:University of Oxford).

[35] Theodore M. Vestal (1999), Ethiopia: A Post Cold War African State. (Praeger: London).

As part of this later move, other political groupings outside the EPRDF were repressed, which was mostly justified by these parties` ill-thought out and self-defeating move of going against the power balance of the period. The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), for instance, went/was driven out of the transition when it objected against the operation of the Oromo People Democratic Organization (OPDO) that constricted its operation in Oromia.[36] As the 1992 election approached, the OPDO supported by the EPRDF/TPLF and the OLF entered into confrontation leading to the neutralization of the latter. Likewise, the EPRDF effectively exploited the adventurous decision of the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) to undertake a referendum on the possibility of the Somali nation succeeding from Ethiopia.[37] The EPRDF swiftly responded to this move by imprisoning some of the leadership of the ONLF and forcing others to flee the country. The EPRDF eventually organized a pro-EPRDF Somali party that controlled power in the Somali region.[38] When other rival parties did not make such outlandish political blunders, the EPRDF fabricated charges to neutralize these movements. Professor Asrat Woldeyes, a leader of the All-Amhara Movement was, for instance, thrown into jail in 1994 on the politically motivated accusation of 'conspiring to overthrow the government': even when he completed his initial two year imprisonment, trail based on a new charge set off and court cases were repeatedly adjourned . By similar such moves, a number of other organizations were harassed so much that by the time of the 1994 election most had either left for the bush or boycotted the election. Thus, the collective action problem of restraining powerful actors from pursuing their goals through the deployment of violence was overcome through EPRDF`s repressive capacity which was emboldened due to its military victory against the previous DERG military regime. Due to the

repression of alternative forces and the top-down nature of EPRDF governance, the prospect of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition was thus entirely dependent on the decision of the top leadership of the EPRDF. Building a pro-developmental coalition would have required the top leadership to not only recognize the need to overcome the two collective action problems but also take measures to address them.

While the collective action problem of controlling violence was overcome within a few years, the EPRDF struggled to prevent powerful actors within the EPRDF from using their power to pursue short-tern unproductive rent-seeking practices. The need to overcome this second collective action problem of subordinating immediate short-term interests to long term developmental goals was neither recognized nor measures taken to this end in the 1990s.[39] In fact, within a couple of years after its seizure of power, the issue of selective benefit and privilege necessary to hold a coalition together began to surface, foreclosing the prospect of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition.[40] As the EPRDF seized power and assigned its leaders and member to various state structures with their varying level of reward and compensation this second collective action problem began to surface. The veteran members of the EPRDF began to complain that the higher leadership abused other members to control power and enjoy the spoils thereafter.[41]

Driven by the liberation mentality, the party structure began to engage in petty and grand corruption. At lower level, membership in local governments and the EPRDF became an instrument for satisfying livelihood concerns whereas the higher leadership was unable to articulate a clear ideological direction.[42] Though the goal of reducing poverty and realizing some modicum of

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[36] Marina Ottaway (1995), 'The Ethiopian Transition: Democratization or New Authoritarianism?,' *Northeast African Studies* 2(3)67-84.

[37] Abdi Ismail Samatar (2004), 'Ethiopian Federalism: Autonomy Versus Control in the Somali Region,' *Third World Quarterly* 25(6)1134-1154.

[38] Ibid.

[39] EPRDF (2010 EC), ኢሃዲግ ከምስረታ እስከ 2002 *(EPRDF from Estblishment to 2010)* (Addis Ababa: Mega Printing Plc).

[40] Mulugeta Gebrehiwot Berhe (2020), *Laying the Past to Rest : The EPRDF and the Challenges of Ethiopian State-Building* (London: Hurst & Company Publishers).

[41] Gebru Asrat (2011 EC), ዲሞክራሲና ሉዓላዊነት በኢትዮጲያ *(Democracy and Soverignty in Ethiopia)* (USA: Signature Book Printing Press).

[42] EPRDF (2010 EC).

developmental outcomes does not seem to have been totally ignored, it was not clear how this would be realized or what this goal meant for the way the EPRDF was organized and governed. Even worse, the Front was not ready to squarely face this fact by engaging in ideologically oriented debate because the top leaders felt that such discussion would lead to division within the coalition.[43] It was only the division within the TPLF over the 1998-2000 Ethio-Eritrea border war that opened the possibility for such a discussion.

3.1. Division within the Ruling Coalition and the Emergence of Pro-developmental Ruling Coalition

The division within the TPLF and later the EPRDF due to differences over the way the Ethio-Eritrea war was conducted opened a window of opportunity for ideological discussion over the nature of the system the EPRDF sought to build and the main threat against it. During this debate, the then Prime Minister Meles Zenawi argued that what the EPRDF sought to build was a capitalist system and the main threat against this was what he called Bonapartist decadence, which refers to the degeneration of the ruling class into a self-serving class.[44] Later the concept was supplanted by the notion of rent-seeking. Meles therefore argued that the EPRDF must renew itself to acquire democratic and developmental features. Those who disagreed with Meles`s characterization of the country`s problem were defeated by a series of manipulations (such as side-stepping the TPLF`s rules and procedures, buying of supporters within the Front and the army, and introducing agenda items that implicated dissenters) and were eventually purged.[45] With the purging of these powerful people, Meles became the undisputed leader

and ideologue of the party and the government. He was now able to forge the coalition according to his vision.

His ascendance paved the way for overcoming the second collective action problem by articulating his vision of the coalition and introducing structures, policies and process through which this vision could be realized. He introduced a party-state 'renewal' movement where he disseminated his vision for both party members and civil servants through an extensive training programme. The trainings were mainly about the ideology of revolutionary democracy cum developemntalism and what this means for the party and civil servants.[46] He explicitly articulated the social composition of his developmental coalition as the alliance of the state, the party, the rural mass and the petite urban bourgeois, forces, he claimed are the main beneficiaries of revolutionary democracy`s goals of heralding democracy and realizing development.[47] He further urged that these democratic and developmental goals were existential concerns of the country and its people.[48] The high intellectual and urban wealthy were, on the other hand, considered as ''vacillators'' and therefore unreliable to join the coalition.[49] The enemy were articulated to be rent-seekers manifested in chauvinism, narrow nationalism and religious radicalism.[50]

To mobilize, organize and operationalise this vision of the coalition, state and party restructuring were re-assessed: the party`s programme was revised; super-minister introduced; a capacity building programme initiated; performance-based business process re-engineering launched; the taxation system updated and legislations on the private sector and on anti-corruption

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[43] Ibid.

[44] EPRDF (1999 EC), ልማት ዲሞክራሲ እና አቢዮታዊ ዲሞክራሲ *(Development, Democracy and Revolutionary Democracy)* (Addis Ababa: Birhan and Selam Printing Press).

[45] Asrat (2010 EC).

[46] EPRDF (1992 EC); EPRDF (1997 EC) ዲሞክራሲ እና ዲሞክራሲያዊ አንድነት በኢትዮጵያ *(Democracy and Democratic Unity in Ethiopia)* (Addis Ababa: E. I. P. D. O); EPRDF (1999 EC-a) አቢዮታዊ ዲሞክራሲያዊ አመራር ጥያቄ *(the Question of a Revolutionary Democratic Leadership)* (Addis Ababa: Mega Prinitng Press).

[47] EPRDF (1992 EC).

[48] FDRE (1994), የዲሞክራሲ ስረዓት ግንባታ ጉዳዮች በኢትዮጵያ *(Issues of Building Democratic System in Ethiopia)* (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information); FDRE (2002), *Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy and Strategy* (Addis Ababa: Ministry of Information).

[49] EPRDF (2011 EC), ህዳሴው መድረክና የአማራ ጥያቄ *(the Renaissance Forum and the Leadership Question)* (Addis Ababa: Mega Publishing).

[50] EPRDF (1997 EC).

introduced.[51] This restructuring and renewal of the party state to imbue it with democratic and developmental character was pursued together with measures aimed at weakening alternative centres of power. As part of the latter the anticorruption legislation and a law prohibiting the private sectors` exploitation of the uncompetitive market were used to weaken private businesses deemed to operate contrary to the EPRDF line.[52] The centralization of rent by means of state and party-owned enterprises, state control over the financial sector, and the exemption of state enterprises and party affiliated business from the laws on the private sector continued.

The need to restrain the pursuit of personal interest by members of the coalition was thus underscored by the very leader at the top of the coalition who also had firm control over the military and was entrusted with huge leeway in the party`s rules and regulation. During this formative period, the top leaders of the party were primarily concerned with recruiting cadres that would be able to realize the EPRDF`s developmental ambition. Increasing their number and entrenching party and state structure down to the lowest level was postponed until later periods.[53] By 2004, this effort at forging a pro-developmental coalition seemed to be paying off as the economy begin to register high growth rates. However, long before this growth was sustained the country experienced a major shock in the 2005 election and its violent aftermath, which compromised the measures taken to subordinate short-term personal interests of coalition members for long term developmental ends.

3.2. The 2005 Shock and Post-2005 Re-Adjustment

Considering the fact that democracy and development were taken as existential necessities and anticipating the oppositions` limited capacity to win in rural areas, Meles widely opened the political space for free competition in the 2005 election.[54] To his surprise, the opposition

quickly organized themselves and secured an overwhelming dominance in major urban areas. Amidist of this, allegation of vote rigging led to protest and a violent government crackdown to quell the protest. Alarmed by this electoral shock, the EPRDF began to take measures that compromised its commitment to overcome the second collective action problems of forging pro-developmental coalition. The incentives and constraints set for coalition members were radically transformed by emphasising political loyalty in the hiring and promotion of civil servants as well as in the promotion of party members.[55] This was supplemented by an aggressive push for the dissemination of the EPRDF view through mandatory training on the ideology of revolutionary democracy and developmental state amounting to coercive persuasion discussed in section two. University students were enticed and pressured to join the party through promises of jobs after graduation and other leadership benefits.

Some regional states began to openly ask applicants to bring party membership letters when they applied for government jobs. In urban areas, benefits related to access to arkebe shop (small container-like shops), access to credit, and condominiums were made dependent on party membership.[56] Using this strategy, the party expanded its membership from about 760 thousand in 2005 to 4 million in 2008.[57] Moreover, EPRDF controlled youth league and women's league were organized to control the youth and women. In parallel, these politicized state structures were extended down to the lowest level by strengthening district and Kebele level state structures (the lowest level administrative structures of Ethiopia) and establishing development and governmental groups that were eventually used for both developmental and political

[51] Weis (2016).

[52] Seid Y. Hassan (2019), 'Corruption, State Capture, and the Effectiveness of Anticorruption Agency in Post-Communist Ethiopia,' *Economic and Political Studies* 6(4) 368-416.

[53] Weis (2016)

[54] EPRDF (2002 EC).

[55] Yohannes Tadesse (2013), ተስፋው ነጸብራቅ *(Rays of Hope)* (Germany: NP).

[56] Wendimu Asaminew (2011 EC), ከአደባባይ ባሻገር፣ የኢትዮጲያ ፖለቲካ ተስፋና ስጋቶች *(Beyound What Is Public: Opportunities and Challenges of Ethiopian Politics)* (Mekelle: NP).

[57] Weis (2016).

ends.[58] These measures were combined with a more aggressive repression of any form of dissent in the country through the introduction of draconian laws crippling the opposition, the media, and civil society.[59] While the patronage enticed members to join the party, the radical closing of the political space limited any option for exiting from the coalition and joining an alternative one, measures that largely parallel what was articulated in the framework of this study.

In the short term, this nature of the coalition did not undermine developmental results and the regime continued to register robust economic growth, which to a large extent was due to Meles's acumen in reconciling the two. He was able to limit the most developmentally counter-productive rent-seeking practices and some measure of integrity was maintained in the economic bureaucracy. For example, though the party-controlled endowments were privileged in a number of ways, a number of them, at the same time, were effective enough to secure International Organization for Standardization certification.[60] Individuals who were part of the leadership team also argue that Meles set limits to the extent powerful actors within the coalition could pursue their self-interests. Melaku, who was the director of the revenue and customs authority, for instance, argued that Meles was instrumental in overcoming the pressure coming from business and other party leaders to subvert the economic rules of the game.[61]Thus, between 2005 and 2012, until the prime minister's rather sudden and unexpected death, the coalition was carefully balancing the need for development with the need for political survival; and which way the coalition was to go was open for speculation. Though there were elements within the Front that sought to pursue political ends even if that means undermining the prospect for growth, Meles was resistant to such moves.

When he passed away in 2012, the Front began being unable to overcome the two collective action problems largely due to societal and intra-party dynamics. Though Meles was overwhelmingly dominant, next to him a number of individuals from the TPLF (which represent just 5% of the country`s population) controlled key positions, a situation resented by other coalitions of the EPRDF and their constituencies. With his death, when discontented sections of the society began to openly challenge the system the EPRDF riven by division was not able to manage these protests.[62] The two lines of division, specifically, proved fatal for the Front. First, prominent members of the EPRDF coalition began to challenge the dominance of the TPLF within the coalition and tacitly supported the protest in their respective region.[63] Second, even the TPLF began to be riven by division between new and old generation leaders.[64] While Meles was in power he introduced a leadership succession programme where the old generation of leader were to be replaced by the new generation so as to sustain the developmental journey of the country.[65] With his passing, division emerged

[58] Selam Hailemichael and Ruth Haug (2020), 'The Use and Abuse of the 'Model Farmer' Approach in Agricultural Extension in Ethiopia,' *The journal of agricultural education and extension* 26(5) 465-484; Rene Lefort (2015), 'The Ethiopian Economy: The Developmental State Vs the Free Market.,' in *Understanding Contemporary Ethiopia: Monarchy Revolution and the Legacy of Meles Zenawi*, ed. Prunier Gerard and Ficquet Eloi (London: Hurst and company).
[59] FDRE (2009), 'Antiterrorism Proclamation No 652/2009,' Federal Negarit Gazeta; FDRE(2009); 'Charities and Societies Proclamation No 621/2009,' Federal Negarit Gazeta.
[60] Sara Vaughan and Mesfin Hailemichael (2012), 'Rethinking Business and Politics in Ethiopia the Role of Effort, the Endowment Fund for the Rehabilitation of Tigray,' Available at Economic Development & Private Enterprise in Ethiopia (publishing.service.gov.uk)

[61] Tamiru Tsigie (28 July 218), 'From the Office to the Prison Cell: The Story of Melaku Fenta,' *The Reporter*.
[62] Birhane Tsigab (2012 EC), *የኢሃዲግ የቁልቁለት ጉዞ፣ የስብሰባዎቹ ወግ (Eprdf S Downward Journey: A Conversation of Meetings)* (Addis Ababa: Far East Trading).
[63] Moses Tofa, Alagaw Ababu, and Hubert Kinkoh (2022), 'Political and Media Analysis on the Tigray Conflict,' Available at https://www.eip.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/POLITICAL-AND-MEDIA-ANALYSIS-ON-THE-TIGRAY-CONFLICT-IN-ETHIOPIA_-finalised.pdf.
[64] Tsigab (2012 EC*).
[65] EPRDF (2001 EC), 'የአማራ መተካከት በኢሃዲግ (Leadership Succession in EPRDF),' *አዲስ ራእይ (New Vision)*.

between the two generation of leaders as the older generation felt that given the new circumstance with his passing they should stay in power while the new generation leaders insisted on the need to sustain Meles`s legacy.[66]

This division crippled any unified action within the coalition and the front continued to lose its pro-development character. Moreover, those powerful elements of the TPLF/EPRDF who were held in check by Meles became unencumbered in their pursuit of short-term material interests at the expenses of maintaining a pro-developmental coalition. The powerful actors in the military and security apparatus, in particular, became ungovernable: together with other elements of the political and military establishments they constituted a mafia like network within the EPRDF.[67] The call to fight rent seeking with a sense of urgency from some members of the leadership was paid little attention and party leaders even expressed fear that the state might have been captured by powerful actors.[68] Though the economy continued to grow, it became obvious that sooner or later this would come to a halt. In the meantime, protest continued to be waged across the country and the states of emergency declared in 2016 and its extension in 2017 were not curtailing this. Amidst of this, Prime Minister Haile Mariam Desalegn resigned. This paved the way for the total collapse of the EPRDF coalition and the ensuing attempt at building a new coalition under the banner of Prosperity Party (PP) by Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed (2018 to present). The TPLF`s rejection of this coalition and subsequent tensions and mistrust between the PP and the TPLF were further accentuated by the government`s extension of the 2020 election. This led to a two year (2020-2022) bloody all-out regionalized war between the PP led government and the TPLF and their respective national and foreign supporters.

4. THE EMERGENCE OF PRO-DEVELOPMENTAL COALITION IN RWANDA

This section traces Rwanda`s quest to overcome the two collective action problems of forging pro-developmental coalitions and the role of Kagame thereof. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) and its military and later political leader, President Kagame, are at the root of the emergence of a pro-developmental ruling coalition in the country. Established in Uganda by Tutsi Rwandese who fled Rwanda during the previous regime, the RPF was one of the most disciplined guerrilla movements.[69] Immediately after overthrowing the *Genociders,* the RPF formed a government of national unity based on the power sharing arrangement of the Arusha Agreement signed earlier. However, the RPF, as the dominant force in this government of national unity, was neither interested in genuine power-sharing deal nor did the situation of the country allow for such a deal. Hence, the five years after the RPF seizure of power were characterized by internal purges and external counter-insurgency.[70]

At first, there were little indication that the RPF would be able to overcome the two collective action problems of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition. Insecurity and violence were rampant, revenge killing common, and the *Genociders* just re-grouping in neighbouring country. It was not also clear how this insecurity would be overcome without more concession for rival Hutu elites who had the advantage of speaking on behalf of the Hutu majority. Moreover, it was not clear whether and how the long-held practice of state sponsored predation would be overcome. Typical of other ruling coalitions, addressing these insecurities and threats became the first priority of the regime after its immediate seizure of power. To this effect, between 1994 and 1999, the regime undertook a number of stabilization and counter-insurgency operations most prominent of which were the operation to dismantle

[66] Tsigab (2012 EC).

[67] Abiy Ahmed (2012 EC), መደመር መንገድ *(a Synergetic Journey)* (Addis Ababa: NP).

[68] Tsigab (2012 EC).

[69] Stephen Kinzer (2008), *A Thousand Hills: Rwanda's Rebirth and the Man Who Dreamed It.* (New York: John Wiley & Sonsu).

[70] Filip Reyntjens (2013), *Political Governance in Post-Genocide Rwanda* (New York, [New York: Cambridge University Press).

refugee camps both within Rwanda and the neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo and the subsequent counter-insurgency operations. In 1996, the government intervened into the DRC and managed to defeat the *Interahamwe* militia (Hutu forces who were accused of perpetrating the Rwandan genocide) and forcibly return the refugees based in Congo. However, far from leading to stability, this measure rather brought the counter-insurgents into Rwanda who by then began to target local authorities, genocide survivors and Hutu who agreed to testify against them. In the next couple of years, a brutal counter-insurgency campaign was waged by the government against the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) forces (Rwanda rebel forces built from remnants of the *Interahamwe* fighting the regime in Kigali) victimizing the local mostly Hutu population.[71] By 1999 the government managed to quell the insurgency and secure a monopoly of violence in the country. Thus, the problem of violence from outside forces was overcome. What was now left for a coalition seeking to be developmental was disciplining forces internal to the coalition, which begin in earnest.

Two main anti-developmental tendencies within the coalition, in particular, were undermining the possibility of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition during this period. First, rising corruption and nepotism within the government had become rampant, generating alarm even among RPF cadres.[72] Second, political division within the government - mainly centred on the (lack of) acknowledgement of the violence against Hutu civilians during the counter-insurgency operation - was undermining the cohesion of the coalition.[73] While these problems were recognized by the RPF, it was hesitant to take drastic measures. Even more, these two problems appear interconnected, which is reflected in Kagame`s fear that taking measures against some corrupt politicians may generate instability and getting a less-corrupt replacement was

also difficult.[74] However, once the government quelled the insurgency in the late 1990s, it aggressively pursued measures aimed at addressing these two issues. This coincided with the rise and centralization of executive power around Kagame.

Kagame initiated the establishment of a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry on corruption that, after investigation, identified a large number of cases leading to the forced resignation of government officials. This was further complemented by other measures aimed at amending laws, establishing oversight institutions, and inculcating the practice of strict adherence to these laws. The Rwandan Revenue Authority and the Office of the Ombudsman were structured to have an anticorruption unit. The Bureau of the Auditor General also commenced its operation by removing more than 6000 ghost workers from the payroll and dismissing another 6000 for the lack of qualification.[75] This was reinforced by civil service reform measures, which included the adoption of a budget law, the undertaking of public expenditure reviews, and the establishment of a parliamentary public account committee. All these further emboldened the skills and competencies of the public administration. More importantly the government continued to make sure that any officials suspected of corruption would be held to account so meticulously that in the 2000s accusations of corruption constituted one of the largest number of court cases.[76] Even when the evidence was not sufficient to make (corrupt) officials legally accountable, other administrative measures were pursued with a sense of urgency and discipline. According to an observer, the president`s impatience with corruption and incompetence is such that he fired a cabinet large enough to constitute an entire government.[77]

That said, during this early stage, the RPF`s call for resignation of officials and charges of corruption were

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[71] Jean Paul Kimonyo and Charles Akin (2019), *Transforming Rwanda : Challenges on the Road to Reconstruction* (Boulder, Colorado ;: Lynne Rienner Publishers).

[72] Ibid.

[73] Susan Thomson (2018), *Rwanda : From Genocide to Precarious Peace* (New Haven, [Connecticut]:Yale University Press).

[74] Kimonyo and Akin (2019).

[75] Ibid.

[76] Frederick Golooba-Mutebi (2008), 'Collapse, War and Reconstruction in Rwanda: An Analytical Narrative of State-Making. Crisis States Working Papers Series,' Available at Microsoft Word - WP28.2.doc (publishing.service.gov.uk) .

[77] Kinzer(2008).

very much about side-lining moderate Hutu and other potential challengers of Kagame as much as they were about establishing a clean and technocratic government.[78] Anticorruption measures were accompanied by other abusive practices such as disappearance, intimidation and human rights abuses against dissenters working in the media and civil society. Moreover, draconian measures were deployed against some of the Hutu politicians with divisive (not necessarily illegal by most standards of legality) speeches. This tallies with what was indicated in the conceptual framework, whereby leaders attempting to build a coalition have to demobilize alternative coalitions.

4.1 Establishing Meritocratic Government

The anti-corruption move was part of a broader effort to constitute a pro-developmental coalition. This is reflected in Rwanda's unveiling of its development vision dubbed Vision 2020 in 2000. A simple search with entry of the phrase 'Vision 2020' and 'Rwanda' in the Lexis Nexis database would retrieve more than 3000 entries indicating the importance attributed to the vision. By contrast, the system retrieves only a few entries for Sierra Leon Vision 2035, and Burundi vision 2025. As part of this developmental drive, the Rwandan ruling coalition also established army owned and party owned enterprises with the justification that in the absence of a strong private sector, these companies should work to create the necessary market and therefore contribute to the development of the private sector. Though scholars' debate whether their presence and use by the ruling elites amounts to neopatrimonialism, state capture or developmentalism, there is wide consensus that they are not meant for the

personal enrichment of individuals running these institutions and their superiors.[79]

The pursuit of the vision was accentuated by other supplementary measures such as *Imihigo*, nationalist narratives and leadership rhetoric. The *Imihigo* traditionally refers to the practice of vowing what one promises to accomplish in front of elders and the community.[80] Mayor and lower-level leaders sign an *Imihigo* contract with the next level and failure to realize what is declared is consequential: it can result in dismissal or even arrest.[81] Moreover, a narrative of Rwandaness where good citizens were expected to suppress their personal need for the common good was disseminated using training programmmes for good citizenship and leadership development.[82] Public use of the labels 'Tutsi' and 'Hutu' was prohibited and Kagame increasingly shifted his governance agenda to focus on delivering results, ensuring accountability and coordination. All these have been pursued while making sure that an alternative political coalition will not emerge mostly through reliance on the soft skill of surveillance and promotion of self-censor.[83] The Rwandan state has an extended administrative reach down to the lowest level and this presence is used to make sure that people`s behaviour/practice is monitored and its alignment with the RPF`s/Kagame`s vision ensured. This is reflected by the fact that most Rwandans feel that they are under surveillance (and some argue they are indeed under surveillance)[84]. Moreover, the RPF government equates good citizenship with full acceptance of the RPF vision for Rwanda and a preference for economic performance based criteria of legitimation.

4.2 The Role of Kagame

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[78] Laura Mann and Marie Berry (2016), 'Understanding the Political Motivations That Shape Rwanda's Emergent Developmental State,' *New political economy* 21(1) 119-144.
[79] Berhanu Abegaz (2015), 'Aid, Accountability and Institution Building in Ethiopia: The Self-Limiting Nature of Technocratic Aid,' *Third World Quarterly* 36 (7) 1382-1403; Golooba-Mutebi(2008); Pritish Behuria (2015), 'Between Party Capitalism and Market Reforms

– Understanding Sector Differences in Rwanda,' *The Journal of modern African studies* 53(3) 415-450.
[80] Kimonyo and Akin (2019).
[81] Thomson (2018).
[82] Ibid.
[83] Andrea Purdekova (2011), '"Even If I Am Not Here, There Are So Many Eyes"': Surveillance and State Reach in Rwanda,' *The Journal of modern African studies* 49(3) 475-497.
[84] Ibid.

In this entire process of forging a pro-developmental ruling coalition the role of President Kagame, as is the case with the late Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia, is outsized. His vision, strategy and tactics have been crucial in shaping the political history of the RPF especially during periods of critical junctures. The speeches of the president during events such as National Leadership Retreat, National Dialogue, State of the Nation Addresses and Liberation Days are generally indicative of this. Most of these speeches aim to augment the pro-developmental character of the coalition. They are about the need to deliver, the need to be held accountable for misdeeds, the need to ensure institutional coordination, and the need to develop homegrown solutions and reject foreign dictation, measures that together help to address the second collective action problems of submitting short term-rent seeking interest for long term goals.

Kagame often warns that without realizing Rwanda`s vision, the horror of the past would repeat itself, that the parliamentarian needs to follow audit reports, that lower-level leaders adopt result-oriented mindset. Often, he frames lower-level leaders` situation to be one of either 'deliver or die' because he claimed that you ''cant (sic) have ambition and the desire to leave our history far behind us and at same time behave as if you can take your time and as if you can afford to have a sense of entitlement'.[85] He argues that ''[i]njustices are a reminder, they keep waking you up and push you to give your all'.[86] Indicating that he does not shy away from taking measures, he generally says ''[i]n the people here, there is something that I cannot reconcile with. It's people taking their time when they should be moving fast, people tolerating mediocrity when things could be done better….That runs my whole system.''.[87] The comment of a minister generally reflects how this pressure is felt by lower-level leader. He said that ''when you work for Paul Kagame, you are working twenty-four hours a day. The ministers absolutely dread those Wednesday-afternoon cabinet meetings. Kagame is so sharp with them. He will look right at a minister and say, 'I am not satisfied. You are not performing well. Either improve or I will find someone else.'''[88]

Similar warnings and urges are provided on the need to account for one`s action. At times, Kagame went as far as saying that the government needs to make sure that those who are fired because of corruption would not get a job in other places.[89] The annual leadership retreat is used to held leaders to account for their failure while appreciating strengths. In such forums, he warned that those who derail progress have to account for their misdeeds, and that leaders need to encourage those who do well to do even more.[90] Indeed, those who were negatively appraised usually submit resignation letters because they fear that not doing so may deny them the prospect of getting any other government job. Aware of the possibility of false reporting of achievement, Kagame often emphasizes the need to have frank discussions, the need to listen to criticism, the need to be open minded, the need to avoid buck passing, the need to take responsibility, and the need to compare oneself with best achievers.[91] He warned that "[e]ven when you go down to the people, real issues are blocked by walls of people who come to welcome you. You only see that and miss the real issues, which are behind that wall".[92]

His speeches are also about the need for institutional coordination where he often tells his subordinates that in addition to their individual responsibilities, they 'also have a shared task of telling Rwanda's story as [they] work to achieve [the country`s] vision and shape the future of [the] country".[93] He urges that "[w]ithout working together, we will not achieve our full potential

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[85] Energy Monitor Worldwide (5 May 2015), 'Kagame Seeks Long-Term Miracle,'; Tendersinfo (27 February 2018) 'Rwanda : President Kagame Opens 14th National Leadership Retreat,'.

[86] The New Times (30 March 2013), 'Leadership Retreat Ends with Renewed Commitment to Vision 2020.'

[87] Kinzer (2008).p.232

[88] Ibid.pp.237-238

[89] Africa News (20 December 2008), 'Kagame Calls for Tougher Measures on Corruption.'

[90] The New Times (02 March 2018), 'Serve Nation with Humilty and Hard Work, Says Kagame'.

[91] Butamire (5 April 2013), 'What Drives Rwanda's Transformation?,' *The New Times*.

[92] The East African (3 March 2018), 'Rwanda's Kagame Reads the Riot Act to Cabinet'.

[93] The New Times (3 March 2011), 'Kagame Urges Leaders to Honour Their Commitment.'

and will not reach the targets we have set for ourselves."[94] Rebuking those who fail to coordinate he warned ''[t]his cannot happen under my watch''…because putting friends together also ''means that if something happens, they will cover up each other and we will never even get to know what is going on''.[95]

This vision and these moves of Kagame seem to have a buy-in from Rwanda`s middle class in general and those educated and wealthy refugees returning from neighboring countries in particular. For them, the promise of being a fully-fledged citizen with the opportunity to participate in and benefit from development process was a welcome challenge.[96] Moreover, the fear of the repeat of the genocide or any other crisis of sever magnitude if the Rwanda`s development project fails seem to have influenced them to support Kagame and his government`s pro-developmental orientation.[97]However, their support for the pro-developmental coalition and the conditions that made their support possible should not be taken as the main explanation for the emergence of pro-development coalition in Rwanda. These factors are rather secondary to the determination of Kagame as the leader of the armed movement and later as the president of the country.

5. CONCLUSION

This study argued that the emergence of pro-developmental coalitions in Africa, by definition, entails overcoming the two collective action problems of, firstly, controlling violence and, secondly, subordinating short-term counter-productive rent-seeking with long term developmental goals. It also argued that the agency of leaders is instrumental in the emergence of such a coalition. The study demonstrated this by taking the case of Ethiopia under Meles and Rwanda under Kagame where there was/is a move to forge a coalition that could potentially overcome these two collective action problems. What is generally considered as a rupture in the developmental drive of these states coincides with the setting of measures aimed at overcoming these two collective action problems in the early 2000s, whereby these ruptures coincided with

these leaders` removal of contenders within their respective coalition.

While the two leaders used a range of tools to overcome the two collective action problems, their tend to be variation in the mix and composition of these tools. Meles largely relied on a coherent articulation of the political-economic vision of the regime, the coalition that benefited from and helped materialize this vision, and a centralized party-state machinery. Kagame, on the other hand, relied more on organizational and institutional tools to overcome the two collective action problems. Rwanda`s overall vision is a cumulative outcome of policies and ideas that emerged in a piecemeal manner and are implemented mainly through state institutions not necessarily through the party channel and party affiliated associations. As per his vision, Meles was willing to experiment with democracy and clean elections, but Kagame was not ready to entertain such an experiment. Moreover, in Ethiopia, the political circumstance following the 2005 electoral shock forced Meles to compromise the quest for developmentalism with the exigencies of political survival, whereas Kagame opted for a more institutionalized approach that focused on building a technocratic and meritocratic state. Finally, though overcoming the two collective action problem was key, this does not seem to be sufficient to register robust growth. More factors seem to be at work in the robust growth both Rwanda and Ethiopia achieved, such as fairly effective bureaucratic capacity, willingness to experiment with heterodox economic policies, and readiness to mobilize society for developmental ends.

So, what does it take for the emergence of pro-developmental ruling coalitions in Africa? If Ethiopia under Meles and Rwanda under Kagame give us any direct answer to this question, it is the inescapable role of leaders in: both recognizing and overcoming the two collective action problems of forging such a coalition; defying any internal and external opposition to it; and reconciling such a move with the leader`s imperative to survive in power. This complex task of balancing competing agenda explains why pro-developmental ruling coalitions in Africa are rare: leaders may not

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[94] Ibid.
[95] Ibid.

[96] Thomson (2018).
[97] Golooba-Mutebi (2008).

recognize the two collective action problems, and even when they do they may have neither the capacity nor determination to tackle them due to fear of losing power. By foregrounding the collective action dilemma of forming coalitions and the role of leaders thereof, the paper thus contributes at once to both the literature on coalition formation and developmental leadership in Africa. The coalition formation literature needs to sharpen its focus on the role of leaders, and the leadership literature need to appreciate the constraining/enabling power of some actors (often dubbed the elite) in and outside the coalition. The category of 'leader' and 'follower' may be too crude to capture such nuances. Finally, it must be admitted that this paper focuses only on situations where pro-developmental coalitions emerge and catalyse rapid and sustained growth. Future research on situations where such coalitions fail to emerge (and why) or fail to catalyse rapid and sustained growth (possibly due to faulty policy) would advance further insight on the topic.

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